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Abstract 
This study investigates how children negotiate social norms with peers. In Study 1, 48 
pairs of 3- and 5-year-olds (N = 96) and in Study 2 48 pairs of 5- and 7-year-olds (N = 
96) were presented with sorting tasks with conflicting instructions (one child by color, 
the other by shape) or identical instructions. Three-year-olds differed from older 
children: They were less selective for the contexts in which they enforced norms, and 
they (as well as the older children to a lesser extent) used grammatical constructions 
objectifying the norms (“It works like this” rather than “You must do it like this”). 
These results suggested that children's understanding of social norms becomes more 
flexible during the preschool years. 
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Children’s norm enforcement in their interactions with peers 
Most everyday human actions are normatively structured within social 
practices such that people act in ways consistent with social expectations. Through 
participating in daily interactions with their caregivers and peers, children learn about 
the norms of their social groups (Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986; Tomasello, 1999, 2009; 
Turiel, 1983, 1998). This paper investigates children’s understanding of conventional 
norms regarding game rules through looking at their norm enforcement in their 
spontaneous peer interactions.  
According to Piaget (1932/1965), children’s understanding of social rules 
begins with egocentric or objectivist stages in which they view norms as non-
negotiable, unalterable facts and only later in middle childhood do they arrive at a 
mature understanding of social norms as a product of rational negotiation between 
equals. In contrast to the Piagetian view, research within the “Domain Theory” 
framework has shown that very early on at preschool age, children are able to 
distinguish different “domains” of social norms (Killen, 1991; Helwig & Turiel, 2003; 
Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1998). Many empirical studies using interview methods have 
demonstrated that preschoolers differentially evaluate moral norm violations (e.g. 
hitting someone) and conventional norm violations (e.g. eating a snack while standing 
instead of sitting), and rate the latter as less serious, less punishable, more context-
dependent and more authority-dependent (Nucci & Nucci, 1982a, 1982b; Smetana, 
1981; Smetana & Braeges, 1990; Smetana, Schlagman, & Adams, 1993; Turiel, 
1983). With age, children reason more flexibly about transgressions because they are 
able to take into account more factors such as interpersonal concerns and group 
functioning (Horn, 2003; Killen & Stangor, 2001; Smetana, 2006). For instance, 
Killen and Stangor have shown (2001) that, as compared to younger school-aged NORM ENFORCEMENT  5 
children, older children justify exclusion more if there is a threat to group functioning, 
although all age groups rate straightforward exclusion of a child from a group as 
unfair.  
In addition, some recent experimental studies have documented that from 
early on, young children enforce social norms to third parties. A series of studies 
investigated children’s interventions to a puppet committing a mistake within pretense 
and other rule-governed games (Rakoczy, 2008; Rakoczy, Brosche, Warneken & 
Tomasello, 2009; Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008; Wyman, Rakoczy, & 
Tomasello, 2009). The converging evidence suggests that both 2- and 3-year-olds 
intervene and protest against the mistakes of the puppet. Three-year-olds particularly 
display normative protests (e.g. teaching, critiquing) using normative language such 
as “No! It does not go like this!” (Rakoczy et al., 2008, p.877), whereas 2-year-olds’ 
protests are more descriptive and imperative such as “No! Not in this hole!” (Rakoczy 
et al., 2008, p.877). While enforcing rules to third parties, 3-year-olds show some 
understanding about the context-specificity of the rules, and evaluate the same action 
as a norm violation in certain contexts but not in others. For instance, Wyman et al. 
(2009) created two pretend play contexts in which the same object, a yellow stick, 
was used as a toothbrush in one and as a carrot in the other. Three-year-olds 
normatively protested when the puppet used the contextually-inappropriate pretend 
identity.  
One limitation in both experimental and interview methods is that they rely 
on non-interactive measures by analyzing children’s one-shot responses to norm 
violations of a puppet or hypothetical characters who do not respond back or 
challenge children’s beliefs about norms. Some observational studies have analyzed 
how children enforce norms within their spontaneous peer conflicts, which are a NORM ENFORCEMENT  6 
significant part of peer interactions (Corsaro, 1994; Kyratzis, 2004). Studies have 
documented that in their peer conflicts, children refer to norms of property 
entitlements or possessions, turn-taking, or aggression (Dunn & Munn, 1987; Hay, 
1984; Hay & Ross, 1982; Ingram & Bering, 2012; Much & Schweder, 1978; Shantz, 
1987; Smetana, 1984). In facing such conflicts, children are responsive to their peers’ 
protests and attempt to resolve the conflict (Hartup, French, Laursen, Johnston, & 
Ogawa, 1993; Hartup, Laursen, Stewart, Eastenson, 1988; Killen & Turiel, 1991; 
Shantz, 1987; Hay & Ross, 1982). Nucci & Nucci (1982a) demonstrated that school 
aged children respond to peers’ moral transgressions (e.g. throwing sand at someone) 
by explaining the effect of the act on victim’s rights and welfare, such as You got it in 
my eyes. It hurts like hell (p.1339) and to conventional transgressions (e.g. spitting on 
the grass) by stating the normative rule such as You’re not supposed to spit (p.1339).  
In the studies on children’s naturalistic peer interactions, children’s response 
types to norm violations were mostly categorized into functional categories related to 
the content of the message such as “injury or loss statement”, but how these 
normative expressions were formulated was not analyzed linguistically. For instance, 
the way children mark agency in their [normative] formulations might reveal their 
perspective on an event (Berman & Slobin, 1994; Budwig, 1995; Kyratzis, 2009). 
When a child uses a transitive construction (an animate agent is acting on an object), 
You must put the pen here, they report the act from a speaker-subjective point of 
view: how things are seen by the speaker or what seems right for the speaker. When 
they use inanimate subjects, The pen goes here, they report the same act from a more 
factual point of view: how things are seen by everyone or what seems true for 
everyone (Berman & Slobin, 1994). Although both statements are normative, in the 
latter case, known as “middle constructions”, the same action is more objectified and NORM ENFORCEMENT  7 
the role of the speaker or the causal agent is downgraded when inanimate subjects are 
used (Budwig, Stein, & O’Brien, 2001; Kemmer, 2003).  
Although observational methods take into account the interactive nature of 
normative peer conflicts, they still have limitations. Investigators do not have control 
over the peer conflict in terms of which child knows what about the norm, the type of 
norm violations (or the type of normative conflict), the number of parties involved in 
the conflict, so forth. Most importantly, it is very difficult to draw conclusions about 
developmental changes in the understanding and use of norms because the contexts of 
peer conflicts are often not comparable at different ages. One cannot compare how 
long it takes children to resolve a normative conflict or what kinds of linguistic 
strategies they deploy in their norm enforcements, if the sampled normative conflicts 
are not analogous. One major gap in the literature, therefore, is the analysis of 
children’s normative disputes with peers in highly interactive, but still experimentally 
controlled settings.  
In the current study, therefore, we experimentally created two contexts in 
which children had to interactively negotiate the rules of a game in dyadic peer 
conversations. In these two contexts, children of different ages (3, 5, and 7) interacted 
with one another in the same context and had equal footing such that they all learned 
the same game with the same rules from the same adult sources. We elicited peer 
conflicts to observe possible developmental changes in how normative disputes are 
resolved and what linguistic constructions (e.g. marking agency) children deploy. We 
used a methodology similar to that of Hartup et al. (1993) and taught children 
conflicting rules of a sorting game comparable to the Dimensional Change Cart Sort 
(DCCS) used by Zelazo, Frye, and Rapus (1996). In Study 1, pairs of 3- and 5-year-
olds were presented with simple sorting games. In Study 2, pairs of 5- and 7-year-olds NORM ENFORCEMENT  8 
were presented with complex sorting games. In both studies, in the incompatible 
context, one child was taught to sort the items by shape, and the other by color, such 
that the placement of the first item by a child would be a rule violation for his/her 
partner. In the other context, the compatible context, both children were taught to sort 
the items by both color and shape such that the placement of the first item by a child 
would not necessarily be a rule violation, but the appropriateness of that action would 
depend on which game the children decide to play and would require children to take 
the perspective of their peer partners. We first analyzed whether children 
distinguished these two contexts through looking at the presence of normative 
conflicts. We hypothesized normative conflicts would take place in the incompatible 
context more than the compatible context. The difference would be greater in the 
older age groups because they would be better at discriminating the contexts where an 
action is wrong from those contexts where an action is not necessarily wrong. Next, 
we analyzed how easily the children agreed on a rule by looking at how long it took 
them to agree and predicted that they would agree in the compatible context sooner 
than incompatible context. Older children would agree on a rule sooner than younger 
children because they would be more flexible in seeing alternative rules as acceptable. 
And finally, we explored how children marked agency as a discursive strategy in their 
normative expressions to see whether they objectified the rules or they used more 
person-oriented statements. 
These age groups were selected because the literature shows that by 3 years 
of age children are able to follow and detect violations of game rules (Kalish, 
Weismann, & Bernstein, 2000; Rakoczy et al., 2008; Zelazo et al., 1996); by 5 years 
of age they are able to take the perspective of their interactive partners (Wellman, 
Cross, & Watson, 2001); and in middle childhood (age 7 and 8) children show some NORM ENFORCEMENT  9 
further flexibility in their reasoning on moral norms and social conventions (Conry-
Murray & Turiel, 2010; Horn, Killen, & Stangor, 1999; Killen & Stangor, 2001; 
Themier, Killen, & Stangor, 2001).  
 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants  
Forty-eight 3-year-olds (M = 3;9, Range = 3;5 - 3;11, 24 boys and 24 girls), 
and 48 5-year-olds (M = 5;8, Range = 5;5 - 5;11, 24 boys and 24 girls) participated in 
Study 1. The 96 children were grouped into 48 dyads (24 dyads of 3-year-olds and 24 
dyads of 5-year-olds) matched by gender. Within the 3-year-olds, 11 dyads 
participated in the compatible context, and 13 dyads in the incompatible context. 
Within the 5-year-olds, 13 dyads participated in the compatible context, and 11 dyads 
in the incompatible context. The dyads were formed on the basis of the 
recommendations of their teacher and were composed of children who were friends. 
All children were monolingual German-speakers, except for the two 3-year-old and 
two 5-year-old children who were bilinguals. The second languages of these bilingual 
children were Arabic, Russian, English, and French.  
Materials  
There were two sorting games to control for the possible difficulty or 
preference for one of the sorting dimensions (color and shape).  
Board game: Children were instructed to sort the 14 magnets that came out 
of a dispenser according to animal shape (a hedgehog or a bird) and/or color (yellow 
or green). There were 4 types of magnets: a yellow hedgehog, a green hedgehog, a 
yellow bird, and a green bird. Children were asked to place these tokens on a 56.5 x NORM ENFORCEMENT  10 
34 cm magnetic board on which there were two rows. On the head of one row there 
was a picture of a yellow hedgehog; and on the other row there was a picture of a 
green bird, signaling one level of each of the two sorting dimensions.  
Tube game: Children were instructed to sort the 14 wooden tokens that came 
out of a dispenser according to geometric shape (ball or cube) and/or color (blue or 
red). There were 4 types of wooden tokens: a blue ball, a red ball, a blue cube, and a 
red cube. Children were asked to place these tokens into two 6 x 29.7cm plexiglass 
tubes on a platform. In front of one tube there was a red cube; and in front of the other 
tube there was a blue ball, signaling one level of each of the two sorting dimensions.  
Procedure 
The study took place in a quiet room of preschools in a mid-size German 
city. Each dyad played both games and the order of the games was counterbalanced. 
There were two sessions for each game: individual teaching phase and testing phase. 
The entire session lasted around 45 minutes and all sessions were videotaped. 
In the individual teaching phase of the compatible context, both sets of rules 
(the shape rule and the color rule) were presented to each child and the presentation 
order of the rules were counterbalanced. We will describe the procedure in which the 
board game was played first and the color rule was introduced before the shape rule. 
The first child, Child A, went through the individual teaching phase, while the other 
child, Child B, was outside with the second experimenter. The experimenter told 
Child A, “We will play two games. First we will play the color game” and instructed 
Child A to sort the 10 tokens by color within the board game (“All the green ones go 
here and the yellow ones go here. The green one never goes here, because they all go 
there and the yellow ones go there”). The first 2 tokens were demonstrated by the 
experimenter; the next 2 tokens were sorted by the experimenter and the child NORM ENFORCEMENT  11 
together; and the rest of the 6 tokens were sorted by the child alone. If the child made 
a mistake, the experimenter reminded him/her the rule. Children did not have 
problems understanding the rules. Then the experimenter introduced the second set of 
rules within the board game to Child A, “We just played the color game. Now we will 
play the animal game” and repeated the same instructions for sorting the same tokens 
by animal shape. After Child A left the room, Child B entered. The same instructions 
were delivered but the order of the rules was reversed such that Child B sorted the 
magnets by animal first and by color next. In other words, the last rule each child 
learnt was different. This constituted the first teaching phase. In the first testing phase, 
both children were in the room together. The experimenter told them “Now you will 
play together” and left the room. The children played together and sorted the 14 
tokens. Then the same procedure was repeated for the tube game. This time, Child B 
went through the teaching phase first and was taught to sort the wooden tokens by 
color first and by shape next. Then, Child A was taught to sort the wooden tokens by 
shape first and by color next. Eventually, if a child learnt the color rule first and shape 
rule next in the first game, he/she learnt the shape rule first and the color rule next in 
the second game and vice versa. 
  In the incompatible context, the individual teaching phases were identical to 
the compatible context, except that only one set of rules was presented to each child. 
We will again describe the procedure in which the board game was played first. The 
experimenter told Child A, with Child B out of the room, “We will play the board 
game” and instructed the child to sort the tokens by color. Then, with Child A out of 
the room, the experimenter told Child B, “We will play the board game” as well, 
however, instructed the child to sort the tokens by shape. In the first testing phase, the 
experimenter told both children “Now you will play the board game together” and left NORM ENFORCEMENT  12 
the room. The children sorted the 14 tokens that came out of the dispenser. Then the 
same procedure was repeated for the tube game. This time, Child B went through the 
teaching phase first and was instructed to sort the tokens by color; and then Child A 
was taught to sort the tokens by shape. In other words, if a child learnt the color rule 
in the first game, he/she learnt the shape rule in the second game and vice versa. In 
second testing phase, the experimenter told the children “Now you will play the tube 
game together”. The children sorted the 14 tokens that came out of the dispenser. 
The children were not told anything about what instructions their peer 
received. The order of 10 tokens in the teaching phase and 14 tokens the testing phase 
were the same across dyads. One 5-year-old in the compatible condition refused to 
play the tube game so that session was dropped from the analyses. Thus, the dataset 
has 95 sessions from 48 dyads. 
Coding 
All the sessions were transcribed using the transcription conventions of 
CLAN (MacWhinney, 2000). Each line in a transcript depicted an utterance with a 
maximum of one clause. “Utterance” was defined as a clause (complex sentences 
were divided into several lines), a conversational turn, or a group of words separated 
from one another by a pause of 2 seconds. Exact repetitions within a conversational 
turn were excluded from the analyses. We first identified the point at which the 
children reached agreement, and then extracted the on-task protest utterances until 
agreement. Finally we coded each on-task protest utterance for normativity, agency, 
and transitivity. A second coder recoded 22 % of the transcripts for all the variables. 
The agreement between the two coders is reported at the end of the respective 
sections: 1) Agreement on a rule, 2) Extraction of on-task utterances, 3) Extraction of 
protest utterances, and 4) Normativity, agency, and transitivity). NORM ENFORCEMENT  13 
Agreement on a rule. The first coder marked the resolution in the transcript. 
Agreement was operationalized as any kind of verbal agreement (e.g. Ja Ente zu Ente  
‘Yes ducks with ducks’) and/or 2 consecutive compatible moves in the game 
(nonverbal agreement). In about 10% of the sessions, children did not reach 
agreement or they agreed to disagree, each playing by their own rule or moving to 
off-task games. In these cases, the agreement was marked at the point when children 
stopped protesting to one another. If children never reached agreement and continued 
to negotiate the rules until they were out of tokens to sort, then the agreement was 
marked at the end of the session. For the reliability on resolution, a second coder 
marked all sessions for when the children reached agreement. We first determined the 
positions in the sequences of utterances at which the two coders indicated that the 
children reached agreement. In the next step, we calculated the absolute difference 
between these positions per episode and then averaged these values across episodes. 
We used this value as the test statistic in the following permutation test that we ran to 
test its significance (Adams & Anthony, 1996; Manly, 1997). For this, we randomly 
allocated the decision about agreement of one of the two coders along the sequence of 
utterances, separately for each episode, and then determined the test statistic again. 
We permuted the data 1,000 times (including the original data as one permutation) 
and determined the p-value as the proportion of permutations revealing a test statistic 
at least as small as that of the original data such that the test statistic, which was 0.90, 
can be treated as equivalent to the κ value (test statistic: 0.90, expected = 14.79, p < 
.01). 
Extraction of on-task utterances. All the utterances until agreement were 
first coded for being on-task. On task-utterances were defined as all utterances related 
to the rules of the game. Due to our linguistic analyses, 2 types of on-task utterances NORM ENFORCEMENT  14 
were differentiated: clause-level (Hier kommen alle Igel hin. ‘All hedgehogs go here’) 
and nonclause-level on-task utterances (Murmeln! ‘Marbles!’). Off-task utterances 
were defined as utterances that were not about the game or its rules (Das ist eine 
Kamera ‘That is a camera’). The reliability on this was done with the 5 levels: clause-
level on-task utterances, non-clause level on-task utterances, off-task utterances, exact 
repetitions, and unintelligible utterances. The agreement was κ = .84. 
Extraction of protest utterances. Next the protest utterances were 
identified within the on-task utterances. Protest utterances were operationalized as any 
kind of disagreements with the prior statement or the prior action about the rule of the 
game until the children reach agreement. Protests could be in the form of highlighting 
the mistake of the prior move Nein, das kommt nicht da hin ‘No it doesn’t go there’ or 
asserting the alternative rule Grün gehört dahin ‘Green belongs there’. The agreement 
was κ = .79.  
Normativity, agency, and transitivity. Each clause-level protest utterance 
was coded for the following 3 dimensions (1) normativity, (2) agency and (3) 
transitivity.  
Normativity. The coding of the normativity in this paper was mostly based on 
the coding scheme of Rakoczy et al. (2008), which defined normative protests as 
utterances that involve protest, critique, and teaching with the use of normative 
vocabulary. More specifically, an utterance was coded as normative, if:  
(a)  it stated a general rule about the game with the verbs kommen ‘come’, 
gehen ‘go’, and gehören ‘belong’ in present tense such as Nein, Grün kommt 
auf Grün ‘No green comes with green’ or Das gehört zu Gelb ‘That belongs to 
yellow’;  NORM ENFORCEMENT  15 
(b)  it had deontic modal verbs müssen ‘must’ or ‘have to’, sollen ‘ought to’, 
dürfen ‘allowed to’ such as Das muss hier hin ‘It must (go) in here’;  
(c)  it had some normative adjectives or adverbs such as Du hast das falsch 
gemacht ‘You did that wrong’, Das stimmt nicht ‘That is not correct’, Das ist 
richtig ‘That is right’, 
(d)  it was a formulaic normative expression such as Es geht nicht so ‘It 
doesn’t go like that’ and Das machen wir so ‘We do it like that’. 
All other protest utterances were coded as nonnormative and included utterances that 
had: 
(a)  imperatives such as Gib mir den Vogel ‘Give me the bird’ 
(b)  nondeontic modals möchten ‘would like to’, wollen ‘want to’ such as Ich 
will Vogel machen. ‘I want to do the birds’ 
(c)  descriptive protests such as Ich habe das anders gespielt ‘I played it 
differently’, Es ist aber grün ‘But it is green’. 
We then categorized each session for the presence of normative conflict. If 
each child in a dyad displayed at least one normative protest, that episode was 
considered as an episode with normative conflict and all others were coded as 
nonnormative. The agreement on normativity of on each clause-level protest utterance 
was κ = .94. 
Agency. The subject of each protest utterance was coded as inanimate if it 
referred to an object or an action and animate if it referred to a person (including the 
generic person Man ‘One’). The agreement on agency was κ = 1.00. 
Transitivity. There were 5 categories. The utterances were coded as: NORM ENFORCEMENT  16 
(a)  intransitive, if there was only one participant (the grammatical subject) 
such as Ich gehe ‘I go’ or one implied participant Komm ‘(You) Come’, as 
well as the formulaic expression Es geht nicht so ‘It doesn’t go like that’; 
(b)  middle, if the utterances were intransitives with inanimate subjects and 
highly kinetic verbs (‘come’, ‘go’) that involve some motion and direction. 
These included the verbs kommen ‘come’, gehen ‘go’ (when they co-occurred 
with noun phrases within non-formulaic utterances), gehören ‘belong’ and 
modals with locatives Es muss hier hin ‘It must (go) in here’; 
(c)  transitive, if there were two participants (the grammatical subject and the 
grammatical object) such as Ich brauche die Rote ‘I need the red’, Doch, so 
hat der gesagt ‘Yes, he did say that’, or two implied participants Frag ‘(You) 
ask (that/him)’; 
(d)  sein ‘to be’, if there were copular constructions with the verb sein ‘to be’ 
such as Das ist ein Igel ‘That is a hedgehog’; 
(e)  other, if the utterances were incomplete or ambiguous in terms of whether 
they were transitive or not such as Du kannst ‘You can’. 
The agreement on transitivity was κ = .91. 
 
Results 
There were 4 analyses: 1) presence of normative conflict in each session, 2) 
number of utterances it took children to reach agreement, 3) marking of agency within 
normative protests, and 4) the co-occurrence patterns of agency, normativity and 
transitivity. All the statistical analyses were run using R (version 2.15.1; R 
Development Core Team, 2012). There were no gender differences in any of the 
measures so gender was not included in the models for the sake of parsimony. NORM ENFORCEMENT  17 
Presence of Normative Conflict 
We first tested whether an episode had a normative conflict, using 
Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM; Baayen, 2008) fit by the Laplace 
approximation. The analyses were run using the function lmer of the statistics 
package lme4 (Bates, Maechler, & Bolker, 2012) in R. To test the significance of the 
full model, we compared its fit with that of a null model using a likelihood ratio test. 
The models were fit with binomial error structure and logit link function. The 
response variable was a binary measure, session with a normative conflict vs. session 
with a nonnormative conflict (or no conflict at all). The full model included all the 
predictors of interest: age group (3 vs. 5), context (compatible vs. incompatible), and 
their interaction, as well as the control predictors: the game (tube game vs. board 
game), the order of these games (1 vs. 2) and their interaction. The random factor of 
dyad (N = 48) was also added to the model. The null model comprised only the 
control predictors (game, task order and their interaction) and random factor of dyad.  
The full model improved the fit as compared to the null model (χ² = 29.59, df 
= 3, p < .001). The significant interaction between age group and context suggested 
that both age groups had more normative conflicts in the incompatible context than in 
the compatible conflicts, but this difference was greater for the 5-year-olds (B = 2.79, 
SE = 1.36, z = 2.06, p = .04; see the top panel in Figure 1). Namely, 3-year-olds had 
normative conflicts in the compatible context more than 5-year-olds did.  
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 here 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Number of utterances until Agreement NORM ENFORCEMENT  18 
To test how long it took the children to agree on a rule in each session, we 
used a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with one within subjects 
factor (game with two levels: board and tube) and three between subjects: 1) Age 
group with 2 levels: 3 vs. 5, 2) Context with 2 levels: compatible vs. incompatible, 
and 3) Order of game with 2 levels: board game first vs. tube game first. The response 
variable was the total number of on-task utterances (both at the clause level and non-
clause level and regardless of whether they were protest utterance or not) by both 
children in the dyad until they reached agreement. Because there were some episodes 
in which children had nonverbal agreements, and the number of utterances until 
agreement was zero, we log transformed the response variable after adding the 
constant 1. Through this log transformation, the assumptions of normal distribution 
and homogeneity of residuals were fulfilled by visual inspection of a qq-plot and 
residuals plotted against fitted values. 
The repeated measures ANOVA was carried out with 47 dyads because one 
dyad (in the 5-year-old group in the compatible context) did not complete the tube 
game. The significant main effect of context suggested that it took both 3- and 5-year-
olds significantly longer to reach agreement in the incompatible context than in the 
compatible context (F (1,42) = 52.51, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.56; see the left panel in Figure 
2). The main effect of age group showed a trend suggesting that it took 3-year-olds 
somewhat longer to reach agreement than 5-year-olds (F (1, 42)  = 3.23, p = .08, ηp
2 = 
0.07). The interaction between the context and age group was not significant. 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 here 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
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We compared the co-occurrence patterns of normative protests with animate 
vs. inanimate subjects across the age groups and the two contexts, using GLMM fit by 
the Laplace approximation. The response variable was the proportion of normative 
protests to all protests (normative and nonnormative). To test the significance of the 
full model, we compared its fit with that of a null model using a likelihood ratio test. 
The models were fit with binomial error structure and logit link function. The full 
model included all the predictors of interest, that is age group (3 vs. 5), context 
(compatible vs. incompatible), agency (animate vs. inanimate), and the interaction 
between agency and age group, as well as the control predictors of the game (tube 
game vs. board game), the order of these games (1 vs. 2) and their interaction. The 
random factors in the models were dyad and games nested in dyads (see the 
explanation below). There were many sessions without protests, especially in the 
compatible context with 5-year-olds so there were not enough data points in the 
compatible context to make comparisons of interaction terms involving the context 
(e.g. age group and context; agency and context). Thus, we did not include interaction 
terms involving the context in the full model. The null model comprised only the 
control predictors (game, the game order and their interaction) and the two random 
factors. In each model we weighted the response by the number of utterances per 
dyad. 
Thirty-three dyads out of 48 showed protests. Since there were two sessions 
for each dyad (one for each game), not all 33 dyads showed protests in both sessions 
and there were 58 sessions with protests. Thus, the random factors in the models were 
dyad (N = 33) and games nested in dyads (N = 58).  
The full model improved the fit as compared to the null model (χ² = 2558.4, 
df = 4, p < .001); the significant interaction between agency and age group suggested NORM ENFORCEMENT  20 
that both 3- and 5-year-olds used inanimate subjects more than animate subjects in 
their normative protests. This difference was greater for 3-year-olds who used 
inanimate subjects in their normative protests almost exclusively; whereas 5-year-olds 
were relatively more flexible in their choices in the agency of the subjects in their 
protests (B = -0.93, SE = 0.23, z = -4.13, p < .001).  
Agency and Transitivity 
In order to see which type of constructions these animate and inanimate 
subjects co-occur in, all the 644 protest utterances were coded for their transitivity, 
which had 5 levels: utterances with copular (constructions with sein ‘be’), transitives, 
middles, intransitives, and other.  
In their normative protests both 3- and 5-year-olds used predominantly 
middle constructions with inanimate subjects, such as Nein, die rote Murmel kommt 
hier rein ‘No the red marble goes in here’, 80% and 66% of the time respectively (See 
the top panel of Table 1). Three-year-olds almost exclusively used middles in their 
normative protests whereas 5-year-olds seemed a bit more discursively flexible and 
used other constructions in their normative protests such as intransitives with 
inanimate subjects (Das stimmt nicht ‘That is not correct’; 14%) and transitives with 
animate subjects (Du musst die blauen rein ‘You have to put the blue ones in’; 13%). 
In their nonnormative protests both 3- and 5-year-olds used mostly transitive 
constructions with animate subjects such as Gib mir den Vogel ‘Give me the bird’ and 
some copular constructions with inanimate subjects such as Das sind doch keine 
Vögel ‘These are not birds’.  
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 here 
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Discussion 
The results suggested that 3-year-olds were less selective for the contexts in 
which they enforced norms than 5-year-olds did. That is, 3-year-olds had normative 
conflicts also in the compatible context. Second, when facing conflict about the rules 
of the game, 3-year-olds insisted on their rule longer and were more reluctant to 
consider the other rule as a plausible alternative, as compared to 5-year-olds. Finally, 
in their normative protests, 3-year-olds used more limited discursive strategies, almost 
exclusively inanimate middle constructions, objectifying the norms. We will discuss 
these findings in detail in General Discussion.  
In order to have a more complete developmental story, we conducted a 
second study in which we analyzed the negotiations of 5- and 7-year-old children 
because in middle childhood children show some further flexibility in their reasoning 
on moral norms and social conventions (Conry-Murray & Turiel, 2010; Horn, Killen, 
& Stangor, 1999; Killen & Stangor, 2001; Themier, Killen, & Stangor, 2001). In 
Study 2, we presented 5- and 7-year-olds with the same sorting games. Although task 
difficulty was not an issue in Study 1, to make the tasks more interesting for 5- and 7-
year-olds, each game had a more complicated version, in which there were 4 levels to 
each of the 2 sorting dimensions. 
 
Study 2 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-eight 5-year-olds (M = 5;8, Range = 5;5 - 5;11, 24 boys and 24 girls), 
who did not participate in Study 1, and 48 7-year-olds (M = 7;2, Range = 6;10 - 7;11, 
24 boys and 24 girls) participated in Study 2. The 96 children were grouped into 48 NORM ENFORCEMENT  22 
dyads (24 dyads of 5-year-olds and 24 dyads of 7-year-olds) matched by gender. Half 
of the dyads participated in the compatible context; and the other half in the 
incompatible context. The dyads were formed on the basis of the recommendations of 
their teacher and were composed of children who were friends. All children were 
monolingual German-speakers, except for the two 7-year-olds who were bilinguals 
The second language of one child was Russian, and the second language for the other 
child was not specified by his parent).  
Materials 
Each game had a more complicated version.  
Board game, there were 4 animal shapes (a hedgehog, a bird, a bunny, a 
frog), 4 colors (yellow, green, orange brown) and, thus, 16 different types of magnets 
combining each animal shape with each color. Children were asked to place these 
tokens on a 56.5 x 34 cm magnetic board on which there were four rows. On the head 
of each row, there was a picture of a yellow hedgehog, a green bird, an orange bunny, 
or a brown frog, signaling one level of each of the two sorting dimensions. 
Tube game, there were 4 wooden shapes (a ball, a cube, a triangle, a star), 4 
colors (blue, red, white, pink) and, thus, 16 different types of wooden tokens 
combining each shape with each color. Children were asked to place these tokens into 
four 6 x 29.7cm plexiglass tubes on a platform. In front of each tube there was a red 
cube, a blue ball, a white triangle, or a pink star, signaling one level of each of the two 
sorting dimensions.  
In both games, children sorted 12 tokens in the teaching phase and 16 tokens 
in the testing phase. The order of 12 tokens in the teaching phase and 16 tokens the 
testing phase were the same across dyads. 
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The procedure, the counterbalancing, and the coding were exactly the same 
as Study 1. The kappa values reported in Study 1 for the inter-rater reliability on the 
coding apply to Study 2 (Half of the reliability files were from Study 2). The 
instructions were slightly different. In the teaching phases of both games, the 
experimenter told each child, for instance for the color rule in the board game, “All 
the yellows must go in this row; all the greens must go in this row; all the browns 
must go in this row; and all the oranges must go in this row” and delivered the 
instructions the same way for the shape rule in both games. The use of the modal verb 
müssen ‘must’ in the instructions could have been interpreted as encouraging 
normative language. However, the frequency of the modal müssen ‘must’ within on-
task utterances did not change between Study 1 and Study 2. The models (fit with 
poisson error structure) included the control and random predictors, as well as age as 
a covariate. Adding the study type (1 vs. 2) to the model did not improve the fit, χ² = 
1.64, df = 1, p = .19. 
  
Results 
The same 4 analyses were carried out: 1) presence of normative conflict in 
each session, 2) number of utterances it took children to reach agreement, 3) marking 
of agency within normative protests, and 4) the co-occurrence patterns of agency, 
normativity and transitivity. 
Presence of Normative Conflict 
We ran a GLMM model in which the response variable was a binary 
measure, session with a normative conflict vs. session with a nonnormative conflict 
(or no conflict at all). The full model included all the predictors of interest: age group 
(5 vs. 7), context (compatible vs. incompatible), and their interaction, as well as the NORM ENFORCEMENT  24 
control predictors: the game (tube game vs. board game), the order of these games (1 
vs. 2) and their interaction. The random factor of dyad (N = 48) was also added to the 
model. The null model comprised only the control predictors (game, task order and 
their interaction) and random factor of dyad.  
The full model improved the fit as compared to the null model (χ² = 32.89, df 
= 3, p < .001). However, the interaction between age group and context was not 
significant (B = 16.21, SE = 3932.43, z = 0.004, p = .99), so this interaction was 
removed from the model to get interpretable tests of the main effects. The only 
significant main effect of context suggested that both 5- and 7-year-olds had 
normative conflicts more in the incompatible context than compatible context (B = 
4.34, SE = 1.19, z = 3.62, p < .001; see the bottom panel in Figure 1). 
Number of utterances until Agreement 
We used a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with one within 
subjects factor (game with two levels: board and tube) and three between subjects: 1) 
Age group with 2 levels: 5 vs. 7, 2) Context with 2 levels: compatible vs. 
incompatible, and 3) Order of game with 2 levels: board game first vs. tube game 
first. The response variable was the total number of on-task utterances (both at the 
clause level and non-clause level and regardless of whether they were protest 
utterance or not) by both children in the dyad until they reached agreement. We log 
transformed the response variable. Through this log transformation, the assumptions 
of normal distribution and homogeneity of residuals were fulfilled by visual 
inspection of a qq-plot and residuals plotted against fitted values. 
The repeated measures ANOVA revealed only a significant effect of context, 
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in the incompatible context than in the compatible context (F (1, 43) = 49.28, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .53; see the right panel in Figure 2). 
Marking of Agency within Normative Protests 
To compare the co-occurrence patterns of normative protests with animate 
vs. inanimate subjects across the age groups and the two contexts, we ran GLMM in 
which the response variable was the proportion of normative protests to all protests 
(normative and nonnormative). The full model included all the predictors of interest, 
that is age group (5 vs. 7), context (compatible vs. incompatible), agency (animate vs. 
inanimate), and the interaction between agency and age group, as well as the control 
predictors of the game (tube game vs. board game), the order of these games (1 vs. 2) 
and their interaction. The random factors in the models were dyad and games nested 
in dyads. There were many sessions without any protest, especially in the compatible 
context so there were not enough data points in the compatible context to make 
comparisons of interaction terms involving the context. Thus, we did not include 
interaction terms involving context in the full model. The null model comprised only 
the control predictors (game, the game order, and their interaction) and the two 
random factors. In each model we weighted the response by the number of utterances 
per dyad. 
The full model improved the fit as compared to the null model (χ² = 1570.0, 
df = 4, p < .001); however the interaction between agency and age group was not 
significant (B = 0.12, SE = 0.19, z = 0.61, p = .54) so this interaction was dropped 
from the model to get the interpretable results of the main effects. The only significant 
main effect of agency suggested that in their normative protests, both 5- and 7-year-
olds used inanimate subjects more than they used animate subjects (B = 3.08, SE = 
0.09, z = 33.78, p < .001). NORM ENFORCEMENT  26 
Agency and Transitivity 
In order to see which type of constructions these animate and inanimate 
subjects co-occur in, all the 461 protest utterances were coded for their transitivity, 
which had 5 levels: utterances with copular (constructions with sein ‘be’), transitives, 
middles, intransitives, and other. Five- and 7-year-olds did not differ from one another 
and showed the same general trend as the 5-year-olds in Study 1. Namely, they 
predominantly used inanimate middles (61% for 5-year olds, 57% for 7-year-olds) 
and some animate transitives (23% for 5-year-olds, 21% for 7-year-olds) in their 
normative protests (See the bottom panel of Table 1). In their nonnormative protests 
they used mostly transitive constructions with animate subjects and some copular 
constructions with inanimate subjects.  
 
Discussion	 ﾠ
The results of Study 2 suggested that 5-year-olds and 7-year-olds did not 
differ in any of the measures and the patterns were similar to the 5-year-olds in Study 
1. This could be a ceiling effect due to our tasks, which did not require abstract level 
of reasoning. In dealing with more abstract concepts like stereotypes, children’s 
socio-moral reasoning shows progression after preschool years (Conry-Murray & 
Turiel, 2010; Horn et al., 1999; Killen & Stangor, 2001; Themier et al., 2001). For 
instance, in evaluating two candidates, “a boy and a girl equally good at ballet”, for a 
ballet club, school-aged children mostly sided with the candidate who goes against the 
stereotype based on the reasons like “Boys don't get a chance to take ballet” (Killen & 
Stangor, 2001, p.183); as opposed to preschoolers who sided with the gender-
appropriate candidate in comparable contexts (Themier et al., 2001).  
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The findings suggested that the way 3-year-olds negotiated game rules with 
their peers differed from that of the older children. In line with the quantitative 
results, Example 1 shows a segment of a dialogue between two 3-year-olds boys, Pete 
and Andre, in the incompatible context in Study 1, playing the board game. Pete was 
instructed to sort the items by animal and Andre by color. Pete states the rule as he 
places the hedgehog on the animal row in line 23 (Lines marked with carets indicate 
the normative protests).   
Example 1: 
  23  Pete:  Und der Igel kommt hier.  
      And this hedgehog comes here. 
>  24  Andre:  Nein, der kommt hierhin. 
      No, it comes here. 
  25  Pete:  Gar nich(t), kuck. 
      Not at all, look. 
>  26    Da komm(en) Vögel. 
      Birds go there. 
  27    Ja. 
      Yes. 
  28  [Andre removes the magnet off the board.] 
  29  Andre:  Aber der hat gesagt, 
      But he said that, 
>  30    Grüne komm(en) zu x hierhin. 
      Green ones go here. 
  31  Pete:  Nein, kuck. 
      No, look. NORM ENFORCEMENT  28 
>  32    Grün muss zu Grün. 
      Green has to (go) with green. 
>  33    Das muss so sein. 
        It has to be like this. 
    34  Andre:  Wah. 
        Wah. 
>    35  Pete:  Vogel kommt nur hierhin. 
        Bird goes only here. 
>    36  Andre:  Wä, nein, das kommt zu … 
        Wa, no, it goes to … 
    37    Nein, kuck hier. 
        No, look, here. 
>    38    Das kommt zu hierhin. 
        It goes here. 
    39  [Andre removes the magnet off the board.] 
    40  Pete:  Nein. 
        No. 
    41  Andre:  Doch, kuck. 
        Yes, look. 
>    42  Pete:  Gar nich(t), Vogel kommt hierhin. 
        Not at all, bird goes here. 
    43    Siehst du? 
        You see? 
>    44    Igel kommt hierhin, Andre. 
        Hedgehog goes here, Andre. NORM ENFORCEMENT  29 
 
As Example 1 shows, these two 3-year-olds exclusively used normative 
protests with inanimate subjects, mostly middles, such as Nein, der kommt hierhin 
‘No it comes here’ (line 24), Da komm(en) Vögel ‘Birds go there’ (line 26), Grün 
muss zu Grün ‘Green has to (go) with green’ (line 32). They both insist on their 
version of rule over and over and do not acknowledge that the alternative rule is 
acceptable. In fact, they continue to argue over the rule for 66 more lines and do not 
eventually agree on a rule. This pattern was also evident in the quantitative analyses. 
As compared to older children, it took 3-year-olds longer to reach agreement and 80% 
of their protest utterances consisted of the same type of inanimate middle 
constructions, which were repeatedly used in their negotiations. 
In contrast to Example 1, the following example shows how 5-year-old boys 
arrive at a resolution relatively more quickly. In Example 2, two 5-year-olds, Roger 
and Rafael are playing the tube game (Study 1). Rafael was instructed to sort the 
items by shape and Roger by color. Rafael places the first token in the tube according 
to its shape. 
Example 2:  
>   1  Roger:  Rafael, du musst die blauen rein. 
      Rafael, you have to put the blue ones in. 
    [14 lines with nonnormative protests skipped.] 
>   16  Rafael:  Aber wir machen (e)s so. 
      But we’ll do it like that. 
  17    Wie ich … 
      Like I … 
  18    Hey Roger. 
      Hey Roger. NORM ENFORCEMENT  30 
>  19    Du hast Recht. 
      You’re right. 
>  20    X zuerst machen wir (e)s so. 
      X we do it like this first. 
  21    Wie du es willst. 
      Like you want. 
 
In line 1, Roger objects to Rafael’s placement of the token with a normative 
protest with an animate subject, Rafael, du musst die blauen rein ‘Rafael, you have to 
put the blue ones in’. After this point, they continue to dispute over the rule, with 
nonnormative protests such as Aber wir haben es anders gespielt ‘But we played it 
differently’ for 14 lines. In line 16, Rafael insists on sorting the items by shape and 
uses a formulaic normative expression Aber wir machen (e)s so ‘But we do it like 
that’. Then in line 19, Rafael implies that Roger’s way can be correct as well (Du hast 
recht, ‘You are right’). In lines 20-21, he agrees to sort the items by color and offers a 
solution in which they would sort Roger’s way first (Zuerst machen wir es so, wie du 
es willst, ‘First we do it like that like you want’), and his way next. Thus, 5-year-olds 
were quicker to adapt to alternative set of rules. 
The findings reported in this study are, to our knowledge, the first systematic 
analyses of how children enforce norms in their spontaneous peer conflicts and how 
this changes developmentally. Through controlling the context (sorting game), the 
kind of conventional norms (rules for sorting the items) and the source of the norms 
(the same adult experimenter), we have documented some developmental changes, 
after age 3, in terms of how selective children are with their norm enforcements in 
different contexts (3-year-olds are not as selective), how long it takes them to resolve NORM ENFORCEMENT  31 
a peer dispute (it takes 3-year-olds longer), and what kind of linguistic constructions 
they use to do so (all age groups use “objective” normative language). 
In their normative interventions, children reminded their peers of the 
“correct” rule of the game. In the current study we looked at the particular linguistic 
constructions used by children of different ages. All age groups, especially 3-year-
olds, preferred inanimate subjects in their normative protests. The use of inanimate 
subjects in expressions like This goes here, This is not right has a more objective 
flavor and the speaker emphasizes that it is not something he wants, thinks, or 
believes but it is rather a fact. The use of animate subjects You must put this here, You 
did that wrong holds the speaker accountable for that assessment and it does not 
completely free the utterance from speakers’ personal preferences and idiosyncratic 
beliefs about the rules. Thus, 3-year-olds almost exclusively took the objective and 
factual view of the event and portrayed the rules as “unalterable facts”. This was also 
reflected in the relatively greater number of utterances it took them to reach 
agreement, their longer persistence on one rule, and their reluctance to see the 
alternative rule as possible as in Example 1 above.  
 One explanation for why all age groups used inanimate subjects in their 
normative protests could be due to the instructions delivered by the adult 
experimenter, who used inanimate subjects (Alle grünen kommen hier hin ‘All the 
green ones go here’). Children could be repeating how the adult had presented the 
rules. However, despite receiving the same instructions, 3-year-olds still appealed to 
normative expressions with inanimate subjects more than older children did. 
Another finding was that 3-year-olds did not distinguish the two contexts as 
well as the older children and enforced norms in the compatible context where there 
were technically no norm violations. In the compatible context, the children were NORM ENFORCEMENT  32 
presented with both rules in each game and due to our counterbalancing, the last rule 
each child learnt was different. The appropriateness of an action was contingent upon 
the joint decision about by which rule the children would play the game. Since there 
were two possible rules, children had to take the perspective of their peer and monitor 
to which rule their partner was orienting. The limited perspective-taking skills of 3-
year-olds might explain why they enforced norms in the compatible context (Perner, 
Brandl, & Garnham, 2003; Perner, Stummer, Sprung, & Doherty, 2002). That is, 
when one child placed the first token without verbally marking which rule he/she had 
in mind, the second child had to inhibit the rule he/she had in mind, and adjust to 
his/her partner’s rule. In these cases, some 3-year-olds did not adjust to the rules of 
their peers, but put forward their own rule, and treated the other’s actions as norm 
violations. The fact that they could not inhibit the rule they had in mind could also 
result from the limited executive functioning abilities of 3-year-olds (Carlson & 
Moses, 2001; Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995). Older children were better at adjusting to 
the rule of their peer. In fact, older children often disambiguated the rules from the 
beginning by asking their peer to which set of rules to commit such as Machen wir 
Farbenspiel oder Tierespiel? ‘Do we play the color game or the animal game?’ or by 
explicitly signaling to which set of rules they are orienting such as Zuerst das 
Formenspiel ‘First the shape game’.  
Overall, the findings are informative about children’s understanding of 
conventional norms regarding game rules. The results corroborate other studies on the 
fact that by 3 years of age, children are aware of such norms and responded to 
violations of them by referring to the rule (Nucci & Nucci, 1982a, 1982b; Nucci & 
Turiel, 1978; Rakoczy, 2008; Rakoczy et al., 2009; Smetana, 1981; Turiel, 1983; 
Wyman et al., 2009). However, this initial normative understanding seems to be less NORM ENFORCEMENT  33 
discriminate and less flexible. At age 3, children seem to be pretty dogmatic about 
game rules and view these as somewhat less alterable. Throughout the preschool 
years, normative understanding seems to get more fine-tuned (Kalish, 2005; Rakoczy, 
2008; Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 2002). Children become more flexible in evaluating the 
right way and the wrong way to play the game; and are more able to divorce the 
current interactive context (a peer wanting to play the tube game and sort the items by 
shape) from the broader general context (the rule of the tube game is to sort the items 
by color). They are quicker to adjust to possible alternative rules, even if this 
contradicts their own knowledge. So what complements children’s normative 
understanding during these years seems to be the appreciation of the arbitrariness and 
the negotiability of conventional norms within rule-governed games, as envisaged by 
Piaget (1932/1965).  
In summary, when facing a conflict or ambiguity about game rules, children 
bring normative order to their peer interactions. How flexibly they arrive at a 
resolution and the linguistic strategies they deploy in their negotiations are 
informative about their normative understanding. Our results suggested that, although 
they know much about norms even in the preschool years, young children’s actual use 
of social norms to structure their interactions with others, especially peers, continues 
to develop and becomes more flexible into the school years. 
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